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1. Introduction
Aliansa Popular Revolutionaria America (APRA). For over six 
decades this has meant many different things to Peruvians. In its 
early stages it meant atudent activism, workers'rights and 
promises of a new social order. To others it represented a 
dangerous and violent force which corrupted a genuine reform 
movement and gave rise to military rule. In the fifties, APRA 
represented broken promises and stagnation. To others, it was a 
party who was finally finding a legitimate place in Peruvian 
politics after years of struggle against the structural realities 
of Peru. In the eighties it was a sign of hope for millions of 
Peruvians against desperate poverty and government bureauracy.
To others, it was a dangerous zing back towards confrontation 
and revolution.
The confusion surrounding APRA and its political position 
since its founding in 1924 is astounding and the search for any 
sort of clear, straight-forward explanation has proven elusive to 
scholars.
There are certain trends and characteristics of APRA,
however, that have been consistent and regular. First, the
importance of a charismatic leader. Raya da la Torre, who
founded the party in 1924, was the centerpiece of APRA, enjoying
unquestioned authority and influence within the party. Second,
the core of the middle-clasa support for APRA from its birthplace
in the atronghold in the northern Peruvian city of Trujillo.
This sector of the electorate haa conaistently delivered
one-third of the vote to APRA eandidatea. Converaly, APRA has
1
2not received regular support from the urban lower-class or 
Indians, deenlte APRA rhetoric aimed at them. Third, the 
tradition of antipathy between APRA and the military. The 
military has historically made it very difficult for APRA to gain 
power. Finally, there has always been a division within APRA 
concerning the direction in which the party was to move. Many 
Apristas felt strongly that APRA should be a violent, 
confrontational movement dedicated to the removal of the 
oligarchy and military. Others believed APRA had to moderate its 
approach and work with the ruling elite to guarantee its own 
political survival.
Theae traditional APRA characteristics held true until the 
emergence of Alan Garcia in 1962. Hie transformation into a 
leader after the death of Haya de la Torre was a difficult one, 
but through this process, many of the historic problems and 
limitations of APRA were overcome.
This paper will trace the history of APRA with a 
forward-looking perspective, discussing what political patterns 
were established, where the roots of the problems within the 
party began and what sort of party Alan Garcia inherited in 1982 
as he tried to establish unity. In addition, the structural and 
political problems within Peru and their effect on APRA will be 
mentioned.
The second half of this paper will concern itself with the 
inner-rivalries of APRA after the death of Haya de la Torre in 
1979 as many of the historic problems within APRA manifested 
themselves during this period. The final s 'ction will analyse
the first months of the Garcia administration* reviewing the 
effectiveness and political strategy of his reforms.
2. Latin Americam Populism and APRA
In many ways APRA is a typical Latin American populist 
movement of the 20th century with foundations of multi-class 
support* integration of the disenfranchised and poor into the 
political process* emphasis on popular culture and a charismatic 
leader in full control of the movement.*
APRA* however* diverged from this model in two important 
ways. Firstly* it drew most of its support from the rural 
middle-class of the north* not from the urban proletariat as in 
the case of most populist parties. Secondly, and more 
importantly, was been a gradual movement within APRA to become 
more receptive to coalitions with whatever government was in 
power in Peru. These coalitions were accompanied with a more 
conservative and status-guo policy, which sacrificed original 
and APRA policy of confrontation with the ruling elite and 
establishment of a new social order.
This conflict between APRA's ideological doctorines of 
confrontation and change versus political realities and political 
survival has been a historic problem for the party and will serve 
as one of the underlying themes of this paper as I trace the 
history of APRA into the eighties and the rise of Alan Garcia.
The conflicts within the party* heightened in the years after 
World War Two* were a manifestation of basic ideological 
differences among party rank and file and repurcusslons from the
4hard political choices made by APRA's leader Haya de la Torre.
The division and confusion within APRA was demonstrated through 
fluctuations between APRA confrontation and compromise with the 
ruling elite, which have caused problems within APRA and in the 
political system of Peru as well.
To truly understand APRA, it is inportant to investigate the 
history of the party and the populist movement in batin America 
in general. William Kornhauser defines populism as a situation 
in which, "large numbers of people engage in political activity 
outside of the procedures and rules intstituted by a society to 
govern political action."3 Mass movements, of which populism is 
one, are based on mobilising uprooted and atomized sectors of the 
population by offering a larger share of the economic or 
political pie. In most cases populism appears to take root in a 
social and political climate subject to rapid and dramatic 
changes, where the political system is unable to digest the new 
demands of society.4 This frustation is expressed in 
extra-instititional forms of political activity like populism. 
Populism is based on a group which, at a certain breaking point 
between tradition and modernisation, begins to realise that it is 
underprivledged and ignored politically. These classes or strata 
are most commonly migrant peasants, urban workers and other 
lower-class members, although populism enjoys multi-class support 
and draws from a wide sector of society. Populism has no 
specific ideology, although classic populism tends to emphasise 
agriculture, traditional society and restoration, regeneration, 
renovation and reintegration of society's political and social 
structures. Rationalism and a charismatic leader also are
characteristic of populist movements.
In Latin America, populism fully emerged in the early 20th 
century with roots extending back to the first Spanish conquests 
and subsequent centralisation of wealth into the hands of an 
elite few. In the late 19th and early 20th century there was an 
economic upswing which favored a considerable expansion in 
foreign trade, shifting the traditional channels of commerce and 
economic development. This led to unbalanced development with a 
huge influx of people and capital into those urban areas which 
experienced the most dynamic growth. This new export-led 
reorientation of the economy, particularly in agriculture and 
mining, laid the foundations for a new urban proletariat whose 
aspirations were to become more involved in politics and receive 
a larger piece of the growing economic pie.
Populism flourished in post-world War Two Latin America as 
mass movements sprung up in Venesuela, Costa Rica and Argentina, 
promising economic growth, political integration for the 
disenfranchised and hope for millions. Throughout the thirties 
and fifties populism grew and expanded its membership. In the 
late fifties, however, populism was not making the electoral 
strides it had hoped for and was not able to provide the services 
it had promised.^ In addition, there was a growing tendancy on 
the left in Latin America to use violence to gain political 
goals, as in Cuba in 1957, which led to the rise of military 
regimes in the sixties to control the unrest. In the seventies 
and eighties there has been revival of populism and a 
liberalisation of the political system as economies faltered and
6the military regimes lost credibility and legitimacy.
Many of these trends in Latin American populism can be seen 
in Peru as well. The most important precurser was Manuel 
Gonzales Prada, a turn of the century reformist and 
politician, who espoused labor and Indian rights. APRA was not 
the first group to have a populist nature, as seen in the earlier 
roots of the movement. However, it has been one of the most 
organized and consistent.
3. Early APRA and Haya de la Torre
Any discussion of APRA must begin with Haya de la Torre.
Born into a middle-class family in the northern town of Trujillo, 
Raya came to Lima as a youtig man in 1920 and quickly became 
involved in student politics at San Marcos University. By 1923 
he was organizing revolts against the government of President 
Augusto Leguia. Haya was deported to Mexico in 1923 where he 
would spend the next eight years. During those years he 
travelled throughout the west, exposing himself to a variety of 
political personalities and schools of thought, including 
Marxism.6 In 1924 Haya officially founded APRA and began to 
refine his own ideological and political views. During his 
absence Haya was made a martyr and began to develop a cult-type 
following among Peruvians. Haya was a rallying point against the 
repression and discrimination of President Leguia.
Upon his return to Peru in 1930 for the presidential 
elections, Httya attainted to rally voters through the presentation 
of The Pive Points of APRAs
71. Action Against Paperitl iss
2. Political Unity of Latin America
3. nationalisation of Land and Industry
4. internationisatlon of tK* Panama canal ,
5. Solidarity with all oppressed reoples 7
More importantly, these five points were designed to provide
an ideological base for APRA. "The Maximum Program" presented by
APRA for the same election emphasised social mobilise*ion and
political participation for those out of power and discriminated
against. The Program was nationalistic, aspens lag an active
anti-imperialist stance and a desire for Peru to control its own
economic fortunes. Raya expanded on the ideas
What Apr ism© considers ruinous for Peru 
is that in our nstd for capital, the coentry 
is converted Into a slave of this capita] 
and instead of this capital serving the . 
country, the country becomes its servant. "
"Capital" here obviously referes to forsign capital.
As far as specific reform ideas, APRA favored a 
reorganisation of provincial boundaries to follow economic 
criteria, including local autonomy, expansion of voting rights 
and decentralisation. Cracial proposals Included socialisation of 
agricultural land, tbs eatabllament of cooperatives and the 
redemption of the native Indians by Incorporating them into 
political life without the lose of their indigenous culture. APRA 
was also a strong supporter of labor, In favor of decreasing work 
hours and more extensive labor laws. APRA favored a 
nsdernlsatlen of tho armed forced and a clear separation bstween 
church and state.9
AfftA was also vary specific about the criteria far 
membership into tbs party end highly organised. Bach Aprista was 
pert of two basic structures! the sector, which m s  a territorial
8unit and the cell, which was based on the member's place in the 
labor process. The sectors were coordinated at the national 
level while the cells were divided Into commandos, made up of 
students, workers, teachers, doctors,and other workers. There 
was rigid organization and discipline within the ranks.*®fhis 
strong, grass-roots nature of APS* would carry into the eighties 
and has much to do with the consistent electoral support for 
Aprista candidates over time. However, the seme organisation, 
combined with heavy symbolism, (APRA flag, hymns, salute and 
motto) were probably resonsable for the facist image of the party 
in its early stages,**and the almost religious-like faith to APRA 
and the leadership of Haya by its members, in addition, the 
elitist following led to alienation of other sectors in Peruvian 
society, as we shall see.
APRA also premised a new social order for its members. If
they satisfied the difficult membership qualifications, Apr 1stas
were then espected to modify their personal as well as political
lifestyles. APRA stressed order, cleanliness ef mind and body,
dedication and self-control. Handbooks were published which
specified exactly how an Aprista should behave.*2
One area which APRA doctrine was weak and underdevelopped
was exactly how to gain political power. Haya provided a broad
framework for the aquisition of poweri
Anyone can lay hands on tha government 
palaee, for the road leading to it is 
bought with gold or seised by force of 
arms. But the assignment of Aprismo is 
to find tha road to the consciousness of 
the people, rather than the one to the 
palace.13
9One inust assume that APRA planned to use instruction# 
education and political integration to gain power. This lack of 
a specific plan for power was a handicap to APRA# lending some 
scholars to accuse the party of preferring to remain an outlaw 
movement rather than take on the responsabilities of actual 
government.
We cannot leave the discussion of the foundations of APRA 
without mentioning the obvious link between Marxism and Aprismo. 
There is little question that Haya de la Torre and the party were 
deeply affected by Marxism. Peruvian Marxist leader Jose 
Mariategui was a member of APRA# a comrade of Raya and involved 
in student riots of the twenties. However# Mauiategui split 
from the party in the thirties declaring himself a convinced 
Marxist.
APRA acepted many of the foundations of Marxism# but was 
more pragmatic in actual application. Attempting to explain the 
Aprista brand of Marxism# Haya explainedt
...just as Bolshevism of Marxism-Leninism 
is a combination of Marxist Socialism 
and Russian reality# so is Aprisma or 
Aprisma- Marxism a combination of Marxist 14 
socialism and the reality at Indo-America.
Raya went further to say#1' We accept in Marxist terms the 
division of society into classes and struggle of those classes as 
an expression of the process of history."15
However# APRA did not carry Marxist doctrine to fruition# 
preferring to use the philosophy in different ways throughout 
APRS's history. The most fundamental difference between 
AFRA-style Marxism and the Marxism of Mariategui was that APRA 
leaders felt the proletariat was too weak for effective political
10
mobilisation and preferred to work through the middle class.
4. 1930's and Violence
As APRA made its first bid in electoral politics in 1931, it 
was apparent that APRA was not going to operate to the letter of 
its original doctrine. In 1930, Colonel Sanchez Cerro overthrew 
the Leguia government, but wbb forced to call for a general 
election in 1931. Raya returned and campaigned heavily, only to 
lose to Cerro, who edged out Hays by attracting the bulk of the 
Lima electorate.
It became clear in the thirties that, • the main endeavor of 
APRA was to win the support of the Peruvian middle-class, which 
began to emerge in the twenties as a potentially important source 
of political and economic power.*^Haya characterized the 
proletariat in the following wordst
...A class still in formation, it has no 
consciousness. In its great majority it is 
composed of rural laborers who are illiterate.
It lacks both the consciousness of class and 
the cultural level which have characterised 
the proletariat of more advanced capitalist 
countries. On the other hand, there is a 
middle class, made up of artisana and peasants 
who own means of production, mining and industrial 
wirks, small capitalists and landowners and 
merchants. To this class belong also the 
intellectual workers, the professionals, the 
technicians. It is this middle group that is 
being pushed towards ruination by the process 
of izperialism. Consequently, there is no 
opportunity for our middle class. This, then, .. 
is the abused class that will lead the revolution. B
APRA placed more emphsis upon development and recruitment of 
the middle class, particularly through the union, where APRA
made impressive membership gains in Haya's native Trujillo and 
the textile workers of Lima.
1 1
Hisorian Carlos Astix described the roots of APRA supports
It was among the lower and middle class 
that APRA developed its following and 
where APRA ideology, backed by the charisma 
of Raya, made its most impressive gains. 9
APRA established a strong base of support among the sugar
workers in the northern region of La Libertad, where Trujillo is
located. Between 1870 and 1932, much of the agricultural
property in that region was consolidated into three large sugar
enterprises. Many small farmers lost their land and whatever
economic influence they might have had. The port facilities were
taken over by the large sugar company of Casa Grande, which
enabled them to control the inports and exports of the region,
displacing merchants and traders. The anger spread through
various sectors of society, including influential journalists
and businessmen. Support from the La Libartad region has bsen
tha most consistent source of electoral power for APRA. For
example, in the 1931 elections, 76.44 percent in the region voted
for Raya de la Torre. In the 1963 election, 75.29 percent were
for Haya, demonstrating electoral consistency.^1
The majority of the remaining support for APRA in its
beginning stages came from those areas which experienced
dislocations of the frustrated merchants, farmers and workers
from the La Libertad region. These areas include central Peru
and parts of the coastline.
Conversly, despite much APRA rhetoric aimed at the migrant, 
and Indian population, the party was not sucoassful in gaining
12
their support. In spite of the fact that the party's leader 
coined the phrase "Indoamerica”, APRA's support among the Indians 
has always been lukewarm, rarely making any large gains. Also, 
APRA has not consistently done well in Lima, especially among the 
migrant workers immigrating from sierra to the city. Although 
difficult to explain, it may be due to the closed and elitist 
nature of APRA combined with the party's own emphasis on 
attracting the middle class vote. APRA's strength, "is based on 
the plantations and the lower middle class of the coastal 
cities.
After losing the 1931 elections, APRA became more hostile 
and demonstrative. There was a wave of accusations of fraud in 
the elections by Apristas, followed by violent outbursts and 
strikes. In July of 1932 one thousand APRA faithful stormed the 
army barracks in Trujillo, killing sixty soldiers and officials. 
Government soldiers were called in and surrounded the city, 
eventually killing at least one thousand Apristas. In addition, 
a young Aprista shot and wounded Cerro in a Lima suburb. This 
violent outburst by APRA, which was denied by some top party 
officials, is important in three ways. First, it began a trend 
of APRA violence and confrontation which would not end until the 
fifties. Second, a division was apparent within the party, 
demonstrated by the denial of involvement in the uprisings by 
some party officials, over which direction the party should move 
politically. Finally, a wedge was driven between the military 
and APRA which would not mellow until the seventiea.
Certain political realities of Peru should also be 
mentioned. The overwhelming tradition in Peru has been the
13
political domination by the oligarchy and the military. Ontil 
the mid-sixties, the military was ready to move in and prop up 
the oligarchic rule whenever it seemed threatened by middle class 
or APRA reformsits. in the hands of this oligarchic elite laid 
the vast majority of economic and political influence, centered 
in Lima. The Indians, migrant workers and lower class have 
traditionally had little political clout or influence.
APRA faced other structural realities in the thirties. In 
addition to APRA-mllitary animosity after the Trujillo incident, 
relations with the church began to deteriorate. APRA's strong 
belief in separation between church and state made the church e 
powerful enemy. The "indegesmo" (concern for the traditions and 
culture of the native Indians) in APRA doctrine frightened many 
of the elites as they were violently opposed to any mention of 
involvement of the Indians in politics. Many elites feared that, 
"They (APRA) were in Peru as fully subversive an element as the 
Communist Party is today in the U.S.,"2*according to historian 
Fredrick Pike. Pike went further to say, "Aprismo drove the 
traditional aristocracy as well as the church and military 
towards a more closed attitude.»2<Although Pike may have
overstated the case, the point was clear. The oligarchy, 
military and church were all opposed to APRA and associated the 
party with violence and revolution. The fact that APRA was faced 
with these structural problems goes far in explaining a more 
moderate party platform later.
Historian Richard Lee Clinton described the confusing 
picture APRA presented in the early thirtlesi
APRA represented an eclectic amalgam of 
anti-imperialist, socialistic and nationalistic 
principles set in an uneven matrix of 
democracy, facism and-the personal charisma 
of Haya de la Torre. 3
APRA leaders recognised the difficulties within the 
Peruvian political scene and began to reform party 
structures in 1931 under Ramon Priale. The reorganisation 
directed even more power and influence into the hands of Raya, 
emphasising symbolism, emotional rallies and cult of the leader. 
The party expanded its organisation in hopes of attracting more 
members through new social centers and Aprista-sponsored 
businesses, placement of an umbrella organisation 
(Confederation de Trabajadores del Peru-CTP) over the unions of 
the northern sugar-workers and formalisation of APRA's youth arm 
in the name of Pederacion Aprista Juvenal (PAJ ), whose members 
swore total allegiance to APRA. On the lower levels, APRA 
grouped members into small party cells to carry out day to day 
activities of the party.76
Although these measures helped internal unity and expanded 
membership, it caused problems as well. There was growing 
criticism that APRA was an elitist organisation and very closed 
to those outside the party. The iron grip of Haya de la Torre 
furthered this school of thought.
As of 1934, APRA "had all the appearances of a mass protest
movement,"27aceording to one historian. This attitude of
confrontation towards the oligarchy would continue through the
years. In 1947. Raya expressed the violent nature of APRAt
Companions, today begins for the 
Apristas a new enapter in the history 
of their party. The pages will he
15
glory or shame. We0will write with 
blood or with mud. 0
The violence and confrontation of APRA continued as there 
were accusations of party involvement in a conspriacy to 
overthrow the government of Luis N. Sanches Cerro in 1936 and 
Oscar R. Benevides in 1939. Top party officials again denied 
involvement in those uprisings, exposing the disagreement within 
the party over which method was most effective to reach power, 
violence of confrontation. The division was more apparent in the 
elections of 1939, from which APRA was banned. The APRA 
high-command preferred Jose Quesada, an independant conservative, 
while many Aprista rank and file favored Manuel Prado y 
Ugarteche, a more moderate candidate. APRA leaders realised the 
dissention within its ranks and finally called for its members to 
abstain. However, many Apristas defied the order and voted for 
Prado.29
The division within APRA was most apparent in }948 during 
the presidency of Jose Luis Bustamante Rivero, who led a 
decentralised and democratic style government in which APRA 
enjoyed considerable congressional influence. As the 
APRA-Bustamente alliance began to crumble and there was 
danger of a right wing coup, Haya decided to prepare a fighting 
force. After much hesitation, he appointed Major Victor 
Villanueva to direct the effort. However, party leaders were not 
totally behind the effort as they denied essential funds to the 
movement, not able to decide whether to react violently or not to 
the crisis. 2®The word for the attack was finally given in 
October of 1948, but only parts of the force participated in the
16
insurrection, with the crucial division in Lima mounting a feeble 
attack. The coup attempt failed and over one thousand Apristas 
were arrested, causing further damage to the already tainted 
image of the party.
The reluctant rebellion attempt in 1946 represented an 
important trend which had been growing within the party since the 
late thirties, a trend of compromise with the oligarchy instead 
of resistance. A historic division within the party, the more 
moderate and non-violent methodology to reach power appeared to 
be winning out among party leaders.
5. 1950s and Compromise
World War Two served to further develop a conservative 
and practical platform of APRA. Party philosophy became 
dramatically more moderate and less antagonistic towards the west 
and foreign capital. The reasons for this change were 
three-fold. Firstly, 1% appeared the horrors of Waal 
totalitarianism and facism had a profound effect on how Raya and 
APRA viewed the world* Secondly, the party seemed more 
comfortable with the western model, particularly the 
adminiet ration of Frank lit: Roosevelt, which was store liberal 
concerniae IntomatiOMl affairs.31rinally, APRA's top leaders, 
particularly neye% began to realise that their confrontational 
attitude may not have been the meet effective method to gain 
ittWOlt that rebellion would mot bre* through the structural 
tool 1%lee et leruviam power polities.
M  for ss specific ettampme, mm deetrine began to emphasise 
the positive eepeets of foreign capital ami dalatad the word
17
"yankee" from its doctrine when Haya presented the new "Aprista 
Maxim" in 1948, APRA softened its land-reform rhetoric and began 
to promote non-violent methods in pursuit of political goals, 
dropping the post of Secretary of Defense, APRA's anti-clerical 
stance was also softened as the party tried to present a more 
democratic image.^
To many Apristas, however, the movement towards cooperation 
with the oligarchy and a softening of APRA's anti-imperialism 
stance was difficult to correspond with the party roots of 
rebellion and a new social order, A large proportion of APRA 
faithful among the unions of the north and students in Lima 
(particularly at San Marcos University) were attracted to the 
party because it promised economic decentralization and changes 
in the political picture.
Understanding this important sector of APRA support and the 
tradition of original party doctrine, Raya presented his 
"historical-space time" theory in 1945. Based on the physics of 
Albert Einstein, Raya argued that history and forms of 
government were relative and while a certain form of government 
may be appropriate for a European country at one time, it may not 
work for a Latin American country at the same time.33Torre said 
Peru was at a stage in "historical-space time" where APRA could 
make certain concessions in policy and doctrine as a means for 
eventual realisation of party goals. Raya criticised orthodox 
Marxists who said there were universal truths and revolution was 
the only method. The "historical-space time" theory gave 
Raya and APRA flexibility and manuvering room without outwardly 
sacrificing original APRA doctrine.
18
However, the maturjtion cf an APRA policy emphasizing 
moderation and concession was not without costs within APRA 
itself. The internal division, which had been apparent in 1934, 
1939 and 1948, became more pronounced in the fifties. Many 
left-wing Apristas were uncomfortable with the new APRA-US 
friendship and opposition to violence. Haya was accused of 
losing touch with party rank and file, answering only to the APRA 
ruling cadre, the military, the oligarchy or to what Haya saw as 
a short-term political gains. The radical leaders of the 
thirties now appeared, *addicted to expensive food and drink, 
silk suits, comfortable homes and chauffeured limosines.* 3*Haya 
was accused of being lasy, indecisive and senile at age fifty.
As the export-led economy of the post-war years boomed, it
was likely that Haya decided to aim APRA policy more directly at
the middle class. Historian Richard Lee Clinton described Hsya's
motives in the following wordst
It is possible that Haya perceived a 
declining responsiveness within the 
middle class to radical solutions once 
the depression years were past and. 
prosperity again seemed imminent. 9
APRA also began courting young officers in the military 
hoping to soften the antipathy of the military against the party. 
In 1946 APRA supported the Sechura Contract,36which made land 
available to the International Petroleum Company, a subsidiary of 
Standard Oil and vivid symbol of foreign capital and Influence.
It was obvious APRA was moving rightward.
In 1956 APRA took a bold and dangerous political step as 
party leaders agreed to a partial coalition with Manuel Prado y
19
ligarteche, exchanging with Prado APRA's political support for 
legalisation of the party. Prado, an oligarchic conservative, 
had been a long-time enemy of APRA and differed dramatically in 
political methodology and ideology. The ruling cadre of APRA, 
however, beHeved that the"convivencla"(in Spanish, "living 
together") with Prado would accomplish two things. First, a 
Prado victory would hurt the newly formed Accion Popular, a 
moderate party under the leadership of the charismatic Fernando 
Belaunde Terry, which posed a great electoral threat to APRA's 
traditioiid1 foundations of support. Second, APRA would be legal 
if Prado gained power and the would not be denied access to 
political involvement like it had so many times prior. APRA 
hoped to dispel the myth of a party unable to rule, a party on 
the periphery of the political scene in Peru.
The "convivencia", however, furthered the rift within APRA, 
as could be expected. The left side of the party felt Raya had 
sacrificed basic APRA doctrine of democracy, empathy towards the 
middle and lower classes, anti-imperialism and anti-oligarchy, 
for short-term gains. Movements toward the military, the same 
military which has massacred thousands of Apristyas only 
twenty-five years earlier, was unthinkable in the minds of many. 
There was a growing reputation among Apr 1stas and non-Apr1stas 
alike that the party was corrupt and opportunistic and Raya de la 
Torre was weak and indecisive.
Within the party there were purges and defections. 
APRA-Rebelde, founded in 1956 in response to the "convivencia", 
engaged in guerrilla operations against the Prado government and 
main-line APRA party. During the 1959 APRA convention, eight
20
leaders were purged because they expressed opposition to the 
convivencia.J'
As APRA moved rightward, the void on the left was filled by 
Belaunde and Accion Popular, Communists and other extreme groups. 
Between 1956 and 1962, 625 new unions were formed as former APRA 
labor faithful saw the party subordinating worker's rights for 
other party goals. °APRA lost student support as well. Through 
the folowing numbers one can see the decline of support for APRA*
1945- APRA and Bustamente received
66% of the vote with APRA delivering 
about 45%
1906- APRA received 50.4% of the total vote 
1956- APRA received 27% of the vote 
on its congressional lists 
1962/63- APRA received less the 1/3 of vote 
1963 municipal- APRA/UNO coalition
received 36,000 votes, less than
the AP/DC alliance 39
In the late fifties, APRA was considered a rightist party,
having lost much of its youth and radicalism. One Lima analyst
described APRA in this ways
APRA is dead. It will continue 
to go through the motions of a 
live party, but it is dead... 
and the main reason is thiss who 
would want to join a party today 
that has two directions,.two 
banners, two ideologies. u
The "two ideologies'1 were first, the original doctrine of 
APRA, which emphasised confrontation and a new social order. The 
second was the path of compromise taken by APRA taken in the 
fifties.
Although APRA saw the dessertion of many party faithful, it 
made gains on the right. Prior to the 1962 elections, one
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prominent rightest described Haya as, "the conservative leader 
this country needs. "^APRA gained support among the influential 
upper class and upper middle class as well as gaining general 
political respect and legitimacy it never had.
In addition, APRA had key structures which continued to 
provide consistent electoral and political support despite the 
change in party direction. Most importantly was the strong 
organization and discipline. Also, the grass-roots structures 
were still in place and continued to recruit the youth of Peru. 
Two arms of APRA were strengthened in this period. The Chicos 
Apristas Peruanos (CHAP), composed of children two-ten years of 
age, and the Juventud Aprista Peruano (JAP), made up of children 
ten to eighteen, eduacated and promoted unquestioned authority to 
the party.42Apra still maintained strong ties with its 
laborers in the northern regions. The workers were lifetime 
Apristas where APRA was a strong cultural tradition. Finally, 
the strength and magnatism of Haya de la Torre remained a staff 
of strenght for the APRA. Haya was worshipped by most Apristas 
and his authority rarely questioned. He represented APRA and 
determined most party policy. In many ways, he was APRA. His 
birthday was celebrated as an Aprista holiday and his name was 
exalted in APRA hymns.
It should by mentioned that the move to the right by APRA 
was not blind or metoeric. At certain times the party would 
participate in demonstrations or organize strikes. However, there 
was a definite movement right which can be seen when one looks 
objectively at the history of the party.
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In the late fifties the economic boom was coming to an end
and Prado began to find himself in economic and political hot
water. Journalist Hector Bejar described the scene in 1957t
The situation could be compared 
to 1932, when a similar wave of 
discontent caused the formation _  
of APRA and the Communist Party 4,5
This time, with APRA on the right, the discontent was 
channelled into the new left. From the late fifties to the 
mid-sixties there was a growth on the left which included APRA- 
Rebalde, Ejercito de Liberacion Nation (ELN) and Communist 
Students Trotskyests. Belaunde's Accion Popular (AP) also made 
impressive gains as it represented a more moderate position.**
The election of 1962, which Haya won, demonstrated that APRA 
still represented a major force in Peruvian politics. The 
party's grass roots organisations delivered 32.96 percent 
(557,047) si the vote.*5This was not a majority and APRA was 
forced to make a coalition with Manuel A. Odria, a conservative 
and historic APRA enemy. Before the coalition could take power, 
however, the military moved in to take over, uncomfortable with 
either Raya or Odria in control.
The fall-out from the coalition with Odria and his party, 
Union Nacional Odrlista (UNO) was severe for APRA. It further 
alienated the remainder of the radical left within the party as 
Aprlstas thought that a coalition with Odria was far too much to 
sacrifice for short-term political gains. Forty prominent 
Aprlstas signed an open letter to the press denouncing the 
coalition, accusing APRA leaders of foregoing concern for 
imperialism, elimination of an oppressive oligarchy and military
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in exchange for selfish reasons.*6
The Belaunde administration failed for a variety of reasons, 
one of which was a successful congressional bloc between APRA and 
UNO, as well as other economic and political problems. As in the 
past, the military moved in to assume control in 1968 as the left 
was far too weak and fractured to mount any resistance.
This concludes the first section of the paper. As the 
military-reformist government of Juan Velasco Alvarado took over 
in 1968, APRA was certainly in the more conservative sector of 
the Peruvian political spectrum. APRA began as a party which 
espoused social revolution and the destruction of the economic 
and political elite of Peru. However, the party became 
frustrated, particularly after World War Two, with its inability 
to gain any sort of legitimate foothold in Peruvian politics. 
Party leaders decided it was worth the sacrifice of some party 
radicalism and the desertion of some Aprista rank and file in 
order to place the party in a position where it might someday 
gain power. APRA spent the fifties, sixties and most of the 
seventies moving rightward at an uneven pace, ending up somewhere 
in the middle. The following quote was a good description of 
APRA in 1977t
APRA is the only party which can 
deliver votes. It controls many 
unions and remains powerful in a 
traditional stronghold, the sugar 
cooperatives of the northern coast.
In the past the party has apparently 
come to an agreement with the military 
hierarchy which involves promises 
and a part in future elections in 
exchange for present peace and quiet.
The government is much more concerned 
with trouble from the left than 
from the vague centre in which APRA
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operates.
6. Early Seventies: Growing Division and Political Isolation
APRA remained a powerful political force and the government 
of General Francisco Morales Bermudez depended on APRA support 
for its legitimacy in the late seventies. In 1975 APRA could 
count on the support of much of the army, almost the whole navy 
and growing support in the middle class.4®APRA organized riots 
protesting military austerity measures and a lack of land reform. 
It was not suprising, therefore, that in May of 1976 Morales 
Bermudez made a speech calling for an end to the historic rivalry 
between APRA and the military. Morales Bermudez's speech 
demonstrated the conlnued support for APRA, even at a point in 
Its history where it was considered weak. For example, in the 
1931 elections APRA gained 76.441 of the vote in the north coast 
department of La Libertad. In 1963 it received 75.291 from the 
same region, reflecting the strong organization and historic 
strength of APRA.45
In the mid to late seventies, however, the problems within 
APRA were becoming more magnified. Between 1945 and 1963, APRA 
support had fallen from 45 to 34 percent of the electorate.55The 
party had not been able to attract or articulate the interests of 
the migrants flowing into Lima from the sierra as they were more 
attracted to the very clear reforms of Odria and Prado. Although 
it did have some success in Lima in 1945 and 1956, consistent 
support was not there.
Also, the new middle class, born out of the export-led 
economies of the fifties and sixties, did not automatically
47
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support APRA. According to historian A.E. Van Niekerk, "these 
people (middle class) could no longer identify themselves with a 
pattern of political struggle in which APRA made the utmost of 
the antagonism between town and country."51
The most crippling and dangerous problem for APRA was the 
continuing underlying split within the party itself over 
ideological lines. As mentioned before, the rift had been seen 
as early as 1931, again in 1948 and was very apparent in 1956 
with the "convivencia" with Prado. In the years 1977 unMl 1985 
this rift became exposed as a number of events changed the course 
of APRA and the political scene in Peru.
Prom 1977, leading into the constitutional assembly 
•lelctions in 1978, APRA still maintained its centrist position 
and continued to lose votes to the left as many Peruvians became 
alienated from the government of Moreles Bermuda*. The APRA 
controlled CTP did not encourage or support a nation-wide strike 
which had been called by the Communist labor union. It appeared 
that, "the military and the APRA have in the past year or so 
reached an unpublicised agreement to cooperate, especially on 
labor matters."5^
The centrist APRA was vaguely associated with military 
policies by virtue of the fact that it did little to stand in the 
way of military directives.
In the May, 1978 constitutional assembly elections, APRA did 
well, gaining 351 of the vote. The growing PPC won 26% with a 
conservative platform. The most amasing effect of the elections, 
however, was the striking electoral gains by the left. Prente 
Obrero Cannesino y Estudiante (POCEP), the Trotskyist party,
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Partido Urificado Mariataquiata (POM) and other leftist groups 
won a combined 28% of the vote, the first time the left had made 
a strong showing in Peru. In addition, the left filled an 
impressive 30 seats in the assembly, with APRA winning 37. In 
comparison, in the 19€0's, an informal poll showed the communists 
with the support of only 6% of the electorate.53
At this point APRA was an enemy of the left, which could be
seen through this analysis in a Peruvian periodical:
APRA has identified the left as its 
main target. Its reasoning goes that 
while there ire similarities with the 
thinking of the right and centre parties, 
with the left there is no room for 
discussion. It (APRA) also sees itself 
as the last bulwark against a left 
wing force whioh according to AfRA 
is prepared to "push Peru into an abyss."54
APRA maintained good relations with the government of 
Morales Bermudas and the APRA-PPC majority in the constitutional 
assembly opposed the general strike called in protest of a 
gasoline increase in January of 1979. Discussing 
decentralization, a policy favored by parties of the left and 
part of original APRA doctrine, a party official declared, 
"regional government (decentralisation) would only open up the 
country to political demagogy."550ne could assume that "political 
demagogy" was the left.
There was little doubt that APRA and the PPC were threotenod 
by the electoral strength of the left and took the gains made by 
the left seriously. At the beginning of the constitutional 
assembly, over which Haya presided, there was an attempt, "to 
corral the left-wing delegates off into committee."5®This effort
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to isolate the left was representative of the political clout 
the left had.
In the summer of 1978, APRA decided that it would have to 
take this leftist movement more seriosly. It began to reorganize 
the party in an attempt to strip away votes from the left.^The 
reorganization was directed by Armando Villanueva, a lifetime 
Aprista who rose through the military ranks of the party and 
represented a more confrontational and forceful side of APRA. He 
was an aggressive and directed politician who believed APRA 
should maintain a certain amount of its traditional roots.
The reorganization was not a wholesale one, but rather, a 
more concerted effort to play up to the left, especially the 
leader of FOCEP, Genaro Ledesma, in an attempt to neutralize
ifi
their power. Hay. received some members of what he called the 
*reeponseble left" end ignored others whom he feared too radical. 
APRA certainly* "would now like to appear more to the left than 
it did during the campaign*” (constitution assembly campaign) 
said one analyst.5*APRA leaders realised the growing strength of 
the left as migrants in Lina* rural peasants and the middle 
class* who suffered from the depression of 1974-77, began to 
pour into the city. These groups had begun to look elsewhere for 
a political outlet es the Morales Bermudez government appeared 
corrupt and elitist.
7. 1978i The Illness of Bays
APRA itself maintained a certain amount of unity until the 
health of Raya de la Torre began to falter in the early months of
28
1979. Almost immediately there was a struggle over who would 
control the party, as Raya flew to Houston for radical treatment. 
The competition was among four main actors:
Armando Villanueva- Controlled the day to day activities of
the party. Considered an antagonist 
towards more moderate Apristas.
Andres Townsend- The cosmopolitan member of the party and
more moderate than Villanvera.
Ramon Priale- Controlled party machinery and had
influence over the grass-roots 
organizational arms of APRA. Moderate.
Luis Alberto Sanchez- Stand-in for Raya and the party
intellectual and "wise-man." Also 
moderate. 60
Perhaps the most Important result of the reorganization was 
the rise of Armando Villanueva* Regardless of the reasons which 
led APRA to court the left, Villanueva's prestige and influence 
grew in the party. As all other major party leaders such as 
Priale, Sanchez and Townsend were occupied with the 
constitutional assembly, Villanvera took over much of the party 
apparatus and organization.*1
In the first stages of Raya's illness it appeared that Luis 
Alberto Sanchez was in control, in April of 1979 he, Townsend 
and Priale went to visit President Morales Bermudez to discuss 
the current political situation. Villanueva was not among them. 
However, Raya was not sure himself who to pass on the leadership 
torch. In April of 1979 he called from the O.S. just before the 
Aprista convention and named a relatively unknown party official, 
Luis Alva Castro, to head the convention. This effectively 
blocked any attempt by party strongmen to consolidate their 
position through controlling the convention# or letting one 
faction or another assume power.*2It was becoming more clear that
the division within APRA saw Villanueva on one side and
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Sanchez, Pciale and Townsend on the other. The areas of dispute 
between the two sides were more complicated than a simple 
political power struggle.
Villanueva had many young followers, which included Luis 
Negreiro3 Criado, Alan Garcia, Javier Valle Fiestra, Carlos Foca 
and Hugo Otero. Prom them we can gain some insight into 
Villanvera's ideas. Otero described APFA policy if Villanueva 
were to win the upcoming 1980 presidential election:
APFA policy will be a clear, democratic 
leftist program, a program whose goal 
is an anti-imperialist state, in other 
worts, a republic of blue and white collar 
workers... We are prepared to confront and 
do b»ttle with injustices, with abuses of 
the powerful and those who do not respect 
rights and are immoral. Shock.troops for 
social democratic revolution. 3
Although these words are not as radical as those of Haya in 
the late twenties and early thirties, Villanueva certainly 
represented a move to the left, a move back to APFA roots of 
anti-imperialism, morality and confrontation with forces which 
stood in the way of party goals. Villanvera also t*ied to open 
up APFA and dispel the reputation of a closed, elitist party 
through the following words, *Aprista membership cards will net 
be necessary in order to save Peru. Everyone will be called 
upon.” He said he would, "stress solidarity with all peoples, 
classes and raceB which prevail in the world,” renewing the old 
APFA tradition of Indoamerica.**Villanvera also supported a 
teachers'strike in early 1980, emphasising his concern for labor.
On the other hand there was the more moderate side of 
Townsend, Priale and Sanches. In an interview, Townsend was
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asked to describe the 'responsable left.* He replied,
That is where there is a difference 
of opinion (between Villanueva and 
Townsend). I will not describe the 
responsible left because I have not 
met it. I said on television that I 
thought APRA was the responsable left.
He (Villanueva) was asked once who 
the responsable left was and he said 
it was the Communist Party, the Christian 
Democratic Party and the PSR. I have 
my doubts about that. 5
A main area of disagreement, then, was over r.ot only who the 
responsable left included, but more importantly, where APRA fit 
into the picture. Villanueva saw APRA as a center party with 
viable parties on the left while Townsend saw APRA already cn the 
left with only radical groups remaining.
Townsend, Sanches and Priale were more conservative and 
shared a preference for compromise and concession with the ruling 
oligarchy and military to keep APRA legitimate. This wsb seen 
through a closer relationship with the Morales Bermudez 
government than Villanueva and sisply through their statements of 
philosophy.
8. 1979i The Death of Raya and Attemps at Party Unity
As already sientioned, the government of Morales Beraundes 
was quickly losing legitimacy and the left was making ispreasive 
gains leading up to the 1980 presidential election. APRA 
appeared strong moving towards the election, able to count on its 
traditional one-third of the vote and the possibility of 
stripping votes away from the radical left. However, on August 
4th, 1979, Bays de la Torre died in Lima. This began a
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year-long power struggle and severly tested party unity. In the 
days just before Raya's death, one could sense how dependant the 
party was on Haya for unity and direction. In April of 1979 
Ramon Priale said, "Haya will preside over the 12th party 
congress and will be proclaimed the candidate for president.”
Khen he was very ill Alan Garcia said, "doctors expect full 
recovery.*®®APRA leaders were afraid to admit that Haya was 
terminally ill because sucession was unclear.
So, when Raya died in August, it left a huge void and large
shoes to fill. Almost immediately, Armando Villanueva and his
aides (which included Alan Garcia),
maneuvered into commanding position 
and his backers swept elections for 
the national-executive council. This 
was possible because Villanueva had 
been handling party affairs for the past 
eighteen months while other politicians 
were involved in the assembly campaign 
or later drafting the constitution. 7
This move by Villanueva antagonised more moderate party 
members, especially Sanches, Priale and Townsend, and furthered a 
growing perception that APRA was experiencing a major division, 
one which could have ended the party. Opponents within the party 
accused Villsiiseva and his aides, Luis Negreiros and Alan Garcia, 
of using the CTP and other APRA organisations to establish 
control over the party. The internal division and isubsequent 
conflicting messages emanating from different party sources gave 
the party an untrustworthy image. Both the left and the right, 
"have learned from experience that APRA can change its position 
from one moment to the next."®®
At the party convention in mid-October of 1979, there was
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anything but unity and consistency. Villanueva von the election 
as the party's presidential candidate by a margin of 641 to 435, 
a victory vhich vas not the landslide he had been expecting,*®and 
demonstrated the division within the party. There were 
accusations of cheating and fraud as disciplinary measures were 
brought against a half-dosen Townsend backers. Both sides, 
■arrived with chains, knives and pistols."70In an attempt to 
foster unity, Andres Townsend was nominated as the 
vice-presidental candidate. This option was supported by 100% of 
the convention, but Townsend said he would not run for an office 
on the same ticket as Vlllanueva.7^After a three-day negotiation 
period, however, Townsend agreed to a compromise which would 
include an APRA leadership team of Villanueva, Townsend, Sanches 
and Priale. in an attempt to convince doubters, Townsend said, 
■basically we (he and Villanueva) follow the same party line."7* 
The next nine months were spent preparing for the 
presidential elections in Nay of I960. When reviewing 
official APRA policy at the tine, it is evident that Villanueva 
was in control of the platform and had moved it somewhat to the
loft in search of capitalising on the new voter pool there. One
political analyst viewed APRA in the following wayt
Villanvera has given a left-wing tilt 
to his campaign by picking up some of 
the demands and slogans associated with 
the radical left like the relstatenent
of sacked-minaworkers and state school
teachers. 9
Villanueva was also in favor of reducing the tax rebate for 
exported manufactured goods, decentralisation, money for youth
and poor projects. Villanueva expanded on his ideas about 
government spending:
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We believe an error has been committed 
with a tendancy towards large public works.
We are going to Intensify small irrigation 
projects, furJamental services using 
internal technologies. 4
Villanueva also promoted "mixed foreign" involvement, which 
emphasised limiting foreign investment according to what Peru 
needed. The leftward swing was clear as Villanueva stressed many 
of the same things that APRA laid its foundation upon - emphasis 
on projects for the poor, against large government monopolies and 
decenttalisation of the government. In addition, the way 
Villanueva handled the Townsend dispute and party divisions 
showed that he was in control. Many thought Villanueva, a 
charismatic politician, could lead the party to victory.
Leading up to the 1980 election APRA had a tough opponent on 
the right, the PPC which, "had emerged as an authentic 
conservative party," and in the centre, AP, which, "occupies the 
center, but without the left-wing appeal that won Belaunde the 
presidency in 1963."7*APRA hoped they could gain their 
traditional one-third from the middle class and dislodge the new 
left for victory. As of January 1980, the race was a close one, 
with AP polling 231 of the nation's electorate and APRA 221. The 
left polled only 13% and it seemed to be weakening after its 
impressive gains in the 1978 constitutional assembly elections.7* 
This was due in a large part to the fractured nature of the left, 
with over seven parties splitting the vote.
The results of the election demonstrated that the precarious 
unity within APRA was not enough to generate the electoral
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support needed for a victory. Relaunde and AP came away with a 
clear victory as can be seen through the election resultsi
AP (Belaunde)....... 1,870,964 - 45.4*
APRA (Villanueva)...1,129,971 - 27.4*
PPC (Bedaya).......... 394,592 - 9.6*
Left Partle........... 652,876 - 15.8* 77
APRA won a majority in Trujillo and other party strongholds, 
but AP won enerything else. Belaunde was, *able to get the 
great mass of voters who had no strong allegiance to a 
party,"78mainly found on the left. Belaunde was more experienced 
politically, with more stature, which the Peruvian electorate 
desired after twelve years of military rule. It was a strong 
anti-military vote. One analyst described APRA's failure in the 
following wayi
Villanueva was unable to attract left- 
wing votes as was laid out in the 
original ca^aign strategy. Nor was he 
able to get votes when he switched his 
campaign emphasis weeks before the election 
in a desperate attempt to keep from falling 
behind Belaunde.79
The internal division within APRA did affect the results as 
"Belaunde probably owed his wide margin of victory to the votes 
of a number of dissaffooted Aprista," a Lima weekly stated. "The 
tensions within the organisation hampered APRA's ability to 
compete successfully with the left for support from new voters 
outside the traditional APRA strongholds of the north."80
After the disappointing results in the May elections, the 
problems with APRA became worse as the party searched for a 
scapegoat. Villanueva, a likaly candidate, tried to blame th« AP 
as he accused them of vote fraud just after the election. There
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was an open dispute within the CTP between the old guard and 
younger members, mirroring the situation within APRA. Julio 
Crusado, a sixteen year CTP general-secretary and APRA senator, 
was in a power struggle with Luis Negreiros, a young Aprista 
backed by Villanueva. Because of his experience and bureaucratic 
control, Cruzado won, but the internal conflict demonstrated the 
degree of division throughout all party structures.
Criticism at Villanueva, which had been heard since his rise 
to power, were becoming more regular. Re was accused of not 
representing the whole of APRA and denying membership to 
qualified APRA candidates. Ris wife was Chilean (Chile was and 
is a long-time enemy of Peru) and not popular among Apristas, 
particularly women. Most importantly, many of the leaders on the 
right side of the party spectrum feared that Villanueva was 
taking the party too far left which, it inportant credibility.
9. 1980t Party Split and the Rise of Alan Garcia
The division came to a violent climax during the party 
congress in August of 1980, exactly one year after the death of 
Haya de la Torre. The party split into two factions as Sanches, 
Priale and Townsend walked out, complaining that Villanueva was 
recruiting members who had no credentials, denying membership to 
long-time Apristas.*3There were also criticisms that party 
policies were becoming too activist and confrontational, that 
Villanueva was Ignoring a large sector of the rank and file 
Apristas.M A particularly bitter area of dispute was whether or 
not APRA should accept a coalition proposal by the Belaunde
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government. After the election, Villanueva 6aid, "We will remain
oe
absolutely independent."osHowever, many Apriotas thought a 
coalition was a smart political move, providing APRA some 
political clout. Villanueva again rejected the proposal, leading 
to more animosity and violence. Luis Alberto Sanches was
Of
attacked and beaten. However, Villanueva and newly-elected 
general-secretary Fernando Leon de Vivero managed to woo back 
Priale and Sanchez, stressing unity and the need to prepare for 
the upcoming municipal elections. Townsend was viewed as too 
difficult to deal with and found himself more and more on the 
fringes of main-line APRA leadership.
As a result of the continuing friction within the party, it 
took party veterans a month longer than any other party to agree 
on a mayoral candidate. The compromise camdidate was Justo 
Enrique Debarbier, a low-risk politcian who, according to one 
political analyst, "will not attract the votes from non-Apristaa 
which are needed to reverse APRA's poor showing in the general 
election."87The political liability of Debarbier demonstrated how 
the division within APRA weakened party decisions and success.
It was said the party was, "more concerned with its internal 
disputes than with congressional work."*8
APRA was faced with very real leadership and image problems, 
which were reflected in the results from the municipal elections 
in November of 1980. APRA did poorly, losing in most every 
sector of the country as AP won most races. Isqulerda Onida 
(10,a leftist coalition made up of four parties and two 
multi-party fronts. Grouped all the forces of the left except the 
Trotskyists, Sendero Luminoso and other groups engaged in armed
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struggle*) also had a solid shoving, taking 49% in Areouippa and 
making gains in Lima as well.89
After the poor shoving in the municipal electionsr Andres 
Townsend, who had come to represent the militant right side of 
the party, was expelled in January of 1991 as Villanueva tried to 
hang on to his crumbling leadership* The Townsend expulsion had 
been building for some months as he had, "openly defied the 
authority of the party's national executive, charging that it was 
a result of a fradulent party congress*"^Townsend accused the 
exective council of being filled with communists and Trotskyiter * 
9e had also broken with the tradition of setttHtrf disputes in 
private within the party, a method which had htlpfd maintain 
party unity for years.
The purges within the party eontf need as Townsend backers 
Judith Prieto deZegarra and Horatio heage were aflat for 
disciplinary reasons. Once again the divialee turned into 
violence as party general-secretary Fernando At Vivero was shot, 
ami backers for both sides came to the petty heiiguartars in 
Trujillo armed. In March of 1981 there were two seperete 
eelelrmtions honoring the birth of Haya, one with the bankers of 
Villanueva* which was the larger one, and another sponsorsi by 
Townsend'*1
The rift was also reflected in the Congress. The rols of 
APRA in the Belaunde congress was summed up in the following 
wordsi
In ths senats, the AP-PPC majority 
can count on ths easy-going opposition 
of APIA vets like Luis Alberto Sanches,
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while in the lower house APRA tends 
to be more tenacious in its politicking- 
which also indicates the degree which APRA 
lacks overall leadership in policy decisions. 2
10. 1981: Attempts at Party Reorganisation
APRA was at low ebb in the early eighties. At. the municipal 
elections APRA had been overtaken not only by iu, but by AP as 
well. It had the support of neither the right or left and 
leadership problems were acute.
There wer* attempts to promote unity through the first part 
of 1981. In April, Alan Garcia was named to chair the APRA 
Reorealisation Committee. Ramon Priale, who was an APRA 
moderate, gave support to the young aide of Villanueva. "It is 
logical for me to express my hope that all APRA members 
understand and support Alan and the members of the committee", he 
said.^ In June of 1981 amnesty was given to all expelled members 
of APRA in hopes of forging new unity.
Certain changes were taking place with the party at this 
time, which foreshadowed tbs fall of Villanueva and rise of Alan 
Garcia. The "opening up" of the party conineed as it had begun 
with the rise of Villanueva* Party organs were not as closed and 
positions granted more on credentials than patronage. Apr lets 
rank and file were pore involved in decisions and subsequently, 
younger Apristas were rising more quickly after the death of Raya 
and the democratization of the party.
Party leadership was changeing as well. Villanvueva was 
replaced as general secretary by Fernando Leon de Vlvero end 
Gerela began to influece policy more through his post as chairman
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of the Reorganization Committee.
Villanueva still hod some control of the party, though, 
mainly through his influence over party machinery, but a 
signifigant portion of Aprista rank and file were supporting the 
candidacy of Townsend or were undecided as the country began to 
prepare for the 1985 presidential elections. In a June, 1982 
poll, one could see the changes taking place within the party. 
When asked, "Who do you think will win the presidency in 1985," 
the figures received for the APRA candidates (other candidates 
polled the remainder, which is not shown) were as follows:
Villanueva...10.8%
Townsend.....6.31
Garcia.......1.3%
Villanueva was losing support to Townsend and even to 
Garcia, who attracted the interest of many young Apristas.
On the party level, the same question was asked with the 
following results:
Left *.,. 
Undecide
.......??*§*
.......... l f . l t
•.... 11.51
irs...3f.lt 95
Although APRA was still the most popular party in Peru, it 
saw a drop of 7.51 from the pifcentage held during the 1980 
presidential election. This was suprising considering that the 
AP dropped li.it from the 1910 election and the left remained at 
about the same level. The poll reflects two things. First, a 
dissappointment with the Belaunde government and second, a huge 
proportion of undecided voters. APRA, as usual, received its 
one-quarter to one-third of the percentage, but was still having 
trouble attracting non-Aprista voters. This was due to the
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fractured nature of the party leadership and the declining 
influence of Armando Villanueva.
The rise of Alan Garcia to leadership was spectacular and 
meteoric. A lifetime Aprista, Garcia first appeared in the upper 
level at party leadership during the last days of Haya de la 
Torre as an aid to Villanueva. Villanueva and Garcia had a 
father-son type of relationship and shared many of the came 
political views and perceptions of APRA goals. Garcia emphasized 
turning back to the roots of the party, stressing 
decentralization, concern for the poor, promotion of the domestic 
production and a degree of skepticism towards the west. Garcia 
had made trips to North Korea and Nicraragua, sympathising with 
their causes. He represented a young and aggressive faction of 
APRA, not afraid to fight or take a stand. However, Garcia was 
not as antagonistic towards fellow Apristas as Villanueva and at 
the beginning of his campaign for president was more centrist in 
policies, as we shall see more clearly closer to the election.
Garcia was in the background of APRA affairs from his 
emergence as an adviser to Villanueva in 1977 until 1982. He 
stayed within the system, but took advantage of the new 
democratization within the party and moved up quickly. Re held 
such key posts as Chairman of the National Ideological Committee 
and Reorganisation Committee. The break for Garcia came after 
the embarrassing losses in the 1980 elections and the rip within 
the party in late 1980 and all of 1981. Villanueva and the party 
had lost much prestige and Villanueva was the scapegoat for the 
failure at the party.
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In November of 1982, Alan Garcia was elected as party 
general-secretary, replacing Leon de Vivero, who had held that 
post 1981. Vivero and Villanueva were dropped to positions on 
the National Executive Committee, headed by party old-timer Luis 
Albeito Sanchez. Garcia won an overwhelming victory among 
Aprista rank and file, seemingly bridging the two factions and 
emerging as a true compromise candidate. Garcia did compromise 
with the moderates within the party by forcing party militant and 
old friend, Villenueva, to drop to a position lower tuan 
Sanchez. 'Garcia, who had been in a quiet battle with Villanueva 
for control of the left wing of the party for some ti 3, realized 
that to have control of the entire APRA rank and file, he must 
incorporate Sanchez and the moderates. Villanueva, who had lost 
much support in the party since 1980, was more of a political 
handicap for Garcia than anything else.
Garcia also gave the National Executive Committee added 
policy-making power, which meant Garcia would have to share power 
with Sanchez, head of that committee. For much of 1982 and 1983 
Garcia consolidated his leadership within APRA and prepared for
A Othe municipal elections of 1983.
11. 1983i Municipal Victories and Growing Popularity
In the summer of 1983 , Garcia was busy pointing out the 
failures of the Belaunde administration. After a prosperous 
beginning, the Belaunde government was falling on difficult 
times. The economy was in a nosedive with low exports, inflation 
and spiraling foreign debt. There were floods in the north and a 
drug trade spurred on by hard economic times. Key industries of
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fishing# mining and agriculture all suffered.**Even the 
government admitted it, predicting# "massive bankrupcies this 
year (1983) in industry and commerce."100
In April of 1983 Garcia unleashed against the Belaunde 
administration in order to rally the country around APRA:
An evaluation of the two and one-half 
years of the government reveals most of 
its promises broken and a more critical 
situation than existed at the beginning 
of its mandate.•• foreign debt has not 
declined but has been abused...
Production has not revitalised.•. The 
million jobs announced have not been 
generated.•• centralism persists.•• The 
foreign policy is not independent but 
rather one of rigid alignment with the 
U.F.••• Rousing is not more accessible 
now to the people but has become scarce 
and expensive.•• The health and 
education of Peruvians has seriously 
declined.•• The real wages of workers 
have decreased instead of increased.
Benefits must be granted to favor the 
priority economic sectors and the 
neediest social.classes —  the bulk of 
the population.01
One could see exactly where Garcia placed his emphasis. 
After presenting the list of criticisms# he continued to outline 
the ten most urgent APRA demands. Included in those were the 
following:
- Absolute priority to the revitalisation 
of the national productive system.
~ Revision and curb on debt policy.
- Clear definition of policy to support 
the working class.
- Decisive support to decentralisation*
- Reorientation of foriegn policy. 1U*
This was just a skeletal framework from which Garcia would 
later expand# but it did serve to give APRA policy direction and
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shoved APRA rank and file that Garcia had specific reform ideas.
The basic policies of Garcia are similar to those of 
Villanueva although the execution of the changes were different. 
Garcia was more moderate than Villanueva and able to articulate a 
wider range of Aprista rank and file goals. He toned down the 
rhetoric of Villanueva and was more diplomatic and politically 
smooth in presentation than Villanueva. Many times Villanueva 
took a far too radical stand. He once praised Cuba's Pidel 
Castro as, "a great leader and patriot of Latin America."*^This 
led one to believe that Villanueva favored a more radical path to 
reach party goals. Garcia, on the other hand, "is a moderate 
man, with a democratic and anti-totalitarian ideology,” according
1 04to one source.
Garcia's policies were more palatable to the majority of 
Aprlatas, demonstrated by his 94 percent victory in the election 
for party secretary.
The new orientation of APRA, combined with the continued 
failure of the Belaunde administration and deterioration of the 
Peruvian economy, served to give APRA some impressive victories 
in 1983 municipal elections. The results at the national level 
were as follows:
APRA...34%
IU.•.30% 
AP...15I 105
APRA won seventy-one of the 155 provincial councils and 13 
of the 23 departmental capitals. It still had difficulty 
attracting votes in Lima as ID, under the strong leadership of 
Alfonso Barrantes, won the first democratically-elected marxlst
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mayor in a South American capitol.106Lima-Callao would be a 
crtcial voting arena for APRA in the 1985 election as one-third 
of the 7.5 million Peruvian electorate was located there.
After the solid victory# Garcia spoke strongly of APRA 
independence and his role in the party. Re declared!
APRA# a party with old political traditions# 
is not dazzled by the victory of other parties. 
<IU victories) Moreover# while Alan Gircifl 
is APRA secretary-genera]# and since a new party 
congress is not planned# APRA will comply with 
the resolutions of its last congress. It will 
continue to maintain its identity and will 
not join a popular front with either the Marxist- 
Leninist# Communist sector# or.an unpopular 
front with rightest parties. 07
12. 1984-5t Preparation for the 1985 Elections
With the secure electoral victory behing him# Garcia began 
to make plans for the upcoming presidential bid in 1985. The 
main thrust of APRA during 1983 and 84 was an effort to attract 
the huge undecided voter pool on the left# which was growing even 
larger. The failure of the Belaunde government and the new-found 
APRA popularity were due in a large part to the inefficiency of 
the Peruvian economy. Strikes which spilled over into battles in 
the streets, the GNP declined 12% in 1983 and grew only 1/2 of a 
percent in 1984# per capita income had dropped 251 since 1980 and 
unemployment had risen dramatically. Inflation was running at 
about 1201 with huge government budget deficits. Peru# as of 
January 1985# was $160 million dollars in arrears in foreign debt 
payments. Corruption among government officials was rampant# 
terrorism had Increased# as had drug traffic.10®Many compared the
43
economic and political situation in Peru to the depression of 
1879 (a result of the war of the Pacific), or the depression in 
the 1930's. These severe structural problems within the Peruvian 
system had much to do with the growth of the left and the 
eventual emergence of a strong APRA under Garcia.
The primary method employed by APRA in preparation for the 
presidential elections was an effort to change the party image of 
a closed, secretarian and violent party to a more broad-based 
one, open to all Peruvians. Luis Alva Castro, APRA's second 
vice-presidential candidate, stated that the party would favor 
cuts in defense spending and slowing investment in giant public 
works projects. v*Another change proposed by Castro, as outlined 
in the Peru Plan (presented in July of 1984) was the attempt to 
open up the party to non-members. This was to be accomplished 
through out-of -party organisations called "Civic Communities to 
Support the Candidacy of Alan Garcia."110They were aimed at those 
citisens who felt more comfortable as political independents, 
not attached to any one party. Another method to open the party 
was an effort to create a "national consensus" involving the 
political cooperation of other political and social forces, such
as the church and the armed forces. "We are very conscious we
illare not the whole country," said Castro in a revealing quote.
APRA also began to emphasise a more technical capability in
an effort to dispell the reputation of unprofessional and
11)naiv. laadarahip. Tha party was awara that it had to atart 
providing non-idaalogical and non-dogaatic solution, to ita own 
organisational problaas and tha problaas of Peru. Tha aain 
raason, hovavar, in tha dacision to ineorporata non-Apristas into
46
the government appeared to be, "the lack of depth and staffing", 
or limited experience and management skills of many 
Apristas. Many governments had done this in the past, including 
Belaunde and Velasco, APRA's desire for such a move, however, 
was more acute as one reviews the party history. Banned for more 
than half of its existence and faced with repression for the 
majority of time, the only executive experience for APRA was a 
few ministries in 1945-48 under Morales Bermudez, The repression 
and rightward swing experienced by APRA prolonged the rule of 
Haya de la Torre, and younger leaders did not have the chance to 
become involved or tested as legislators or leaders. 
"Intellectuals never joined and it is a party of politicians 
rather than technical experts," said one Peruvian analyst.^^APRA 
needed the expertise and skill of non-party members to form a 
modern government policy. One analyst remarked, "It (APRA) has 
had an unfashionable lower middle class, provincial 
image."**5This is was what APRA wanted and needed to change. The 
APRA Government Plan Office, responsable for recruitment of 
Apristas and non-Apristas for the new regime, predicted that, 
"perhaps 30 percent" of the 600 registered professionals at the 
office were not Apristas.***
Nevertheless, in preparing for the electoral program there
still seemed to be disagreement among APRA officials, resulting
in few specifics on policy. Luis Alberto Sanches explained the
process of policy formation in the following wordst
On some points we have clear ideas 
and we can say what they are* there 
are other points on which we have 
clear ideas but we're not going to
47
say them yeti and on other points we 
don't have clear ideas but we're 
going to have them, 1
The areah of disagreement were many, but a clear example 
concerned military expenditures. When discussing the planned 
Chimbote naval base {at a cost of one billion U.S. dollars), 
Sanchez said, "it is a good project which would save money on 
repairs to the fleet.” In addition he said, ”It is inevitable 
that defense spending will increase.” According to Castro,
however, "economic realism* dictated "postponing" starting on the
liftbase. °The military, although much closer to APRA since the 
tenure of Morales Bermudez, remained, according to some APRA 
members, "very mistrustful" of the party while other Apristas 
found the military leadership open and approachable. This 
reflected the continued dual reputation of APRA despite the 
strong leadership of Garcia.
APRA promised a strong stand against government corruption, 
particularly in the police force, an effort to infiltrate the 
drug racket and terrorist operations through military means and 
attempts to improve economic and civilian institutions in the 
south of Peru, where many of the problems originated.
APRA economic policy, the most critical area for attention, 
was not well defined in mid-1983. APRA was committed to shoring 
up weak industries such as agriculture, fishing and mining. APRA 
hoped to put a greater emphasis upon planning and would abolish 
state monopolies on undevelopped mineral concessions and sell off 
existing state companies that had nothing to do with the state, 
like cinemas and bottling companies. APRA planned to further 
protect domestic Industries through trade barriers and
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incentives, increase wages which would boost disposable income of 
consumers, hopefully giving the economy a needed influx of 
domestic capital.115
Although these ideas were considered refomist and libera] 
to many observers, the policies were careful not to step on the 
toes of the wealthy and powerful of Peru. According to 
government officials, there would aoJfc be a nationalization of 
private banks or foreign-owned oil companies, and there would be 
an effort to seek a pact with private industry which would 
guarantee companies access to foreign exchange and credit.120
There was some discussion, although not specific, concerning 
tariffs to protect local manufacturers and to impose complete 
exchange controls, as well as a major devaluation of the sol, the 
Peruvian currency. Concerning foreign debt, the party sought a 
global refinancing of all maturities on a fifteen to twenty-year 
basis and limitation of total debt service to 20% to 25% of 
export earnings. Foreign policy would move away from dependance 
on the 0.8. to a more neutral position.
These reforms presented by Garcia and Castro were not 
dissimilar from those presented by Villanueva when he ran for 
president in 1980. They both shared the same concern for 
domestic producers, a desire to limit the economic centralism of 
Peru, limitation of foreign investment, nationalism and an 
opening up of the party for all Peruvians.
However, with Alan Garcia at the helm, the presentation of 
party platform to both Apristas and non-Apristas was more 
successful. Garcia took office and provided more directed and
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moderate leadership, toning down his rhetoric so as to not 
alienate fellow Apristas. His style of leadership was very 
charismatic and, "he struck a number of respunsive themes,"
i  noaccording to Foreign Affairs. **Garcla emerged as an "image of 
protest and hope" to Peruvians, campaigning everywhere, holding 
meetings in small cities and visiting rural areas throughout 
Peru. His campaign slogan was, "Only Alan can Save Peru."123 He 
seised the imagination of the Peruvian people, capitalizing on 
the national crisis of confidence among his countrymen. His 
strong stance against foreign debt placed Peru in the forefront 
of international politics.
Garcia succissfilly rallied the nation around him through 
such issues as nationalism and reforms
We require a nationalistic state to 
defend the Nation from the monopolistic 
structure of some enterprises whose 
dominant position in the market allows 
for excessive profits... In the name 
of a populist State, in the name of a 
State which I have no hesitation calling 
revolutionary... On the International 
level we revindicate the basic 
intergrationist essence of Raya de la 
Torre as an instrument of defense or 191
other nations against imperialist hegomeny. 4
Garcia called the nation to come together and be united.
"Ny committment is to all Peruvians," he often said.123
Garcia was elected as the APRA candidate f o r president in 
1984, receiving 94% of the Aprista rank and file vote. Clearly, 
Garcia had healed, if only temporarily, the division within the 
party, representing a compromise between the two viewpoints on 
party policy. No party member could deny the massive non-Aprista
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following and the charisma vhich made Alan such a powerful 
leader*
The sometimes pluralism and concessionary nature of the
Garcia government was also represented in the selection of
members to his cabinet. Luis Alberto Sanches was elected APRA's
vice-presidential candidate in Nay of 1984, but he was joined on
the cabinet by Villanueva and other more militant Apristas*
Sanches was a sworn enemy of the probable economic minister,
17 aManuel Moreya. The diverse nature of Garcia's cabinet is an 
example of the strong and democratic nature of his leadership.
One Aprista remarked in 1984, "There are not now marked opposing 
factions within APRA. The great masses are institutionalist and 
support Garcia because he has revitalised the party and is 
leading it to certain victory.
One major area of emphasis for Garcia was to increase APRA 
influence in the south of Peru, traditionally a weak area for the 
party. For example, in 1931, the party lost to Sanches Cerro in 
the south by 11,964 votes to APRA's 3,965. In all subsequent 
elections, Including 1980 and 83, APRA never finished higher than 
second. However, as a result of Garcia's southern campaign 
strategy and the resurgence of the party generally, there seemed 
to be an inctease in APRA popularity. In a poll of August, 1984, 
APRA polled 48.4% of the vote in the south, followed by IU at 
17.6%, AP at 10.3% and the PPC at 5.3%.129The popularity of 
Garcia and the decline of AP influence led to substantial gains 
for APRA in the region. Garcia was beginning to represent all 
of Peru. In a rally in Arequippa, the APRA symbol was simple - a 
large picture of Haya de la Torre with the words, "Alan - Peru"
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next to it. APRA was reviving the revolutionary spirit of Haya 
through Alan Garcia.
During the campaign, Garcia also met with military and 
church leaders, trying to soften the animosity between those two 
groups and APRA. Garcia was careful not to blatently criticise 
the still powerful military, but he did emphasise that, "the 
armed forces should recognise its constitutional limitations."1*1
As the election of April, 1985 neared, Garcia began to 
increase his attacks upon the Belaunde administration and 
reaffirmed his committment to make profound changes within Peru. 
Garcia's tone became more rebellious and angry as he sought to 
build up the fervor and support of the Peruvians.
He attacked the worsening economic performance of Belaunde, 
which included $14 billion dollars in debt, late payment on the 
interest on the debt, inability to find new capital, GNP below 
1965 levels and unemployment/underemployment estimated at 654. **2 
He also unleashed a harsh attack on the U.S. in early 1985*
I believe the Ronald Reagan administration 
is a revival of the most hard-line Republicanism, 
fhe increase in interest rates, the pejorative 
treatment of Latin America, the reference to 
Central America as a backyard and that absurd 
bipolar idea that every problem in Latin 
America is solely the Soviets work are grave 
diplomatic errors.
Garcia stressed Peruvian nationalism and a confrontational 
attitude toward any force, either domestic or international, 
which stood in the way of the progress of Peru.
He also depended heavily on the myth, charisma and tradition 
of Haya to increase the enthusiasm and committment of the
130
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Peruvians:
I invoke with the name of God 
the spirit of Haya de la Torre 
to light our path and give us 
strength. I must say that his 
life and his example are present 
here and that his proposals added 
to those men of good faith in 
this land the insignia of a 
government for all, but especially 
for the poorest.and those who suffer 
most in Peru. 4
13. 3985s Election Victory Initial Reform Measures
The election results of April 14, 1985 proved to be a 
landslide victory for Alan Garcia and APRA. The results are 
below:
Garcia (APRA)...... 3,629,758 (48%)
Barrantes (UL)..... 1,780,560 (23.5%)
Bedoya (PPC)......... 922,560 (12.2%)
Alva (AP)............ 378,752 (5%) 135
As predicted, APRA had successfully attracted the huge 
undecided vote, at one point believed to be 30% of the 
electorate. There was a sharp fall in the blank and disqualified 
voters (cut in half from the 1980 election) which APRA was able 
to reach. Both Garcia and the UL candidate, Barrantes, were 
successful in mobilizing the workers, urban dwellers, peasants 
and Indians, offering them a ray of hope and avenue of escape 
from economic turmoil. The middle class, who feared a leftist 
victory, voted for Alan. The saturation campaign by APRA, with a 
heavy use of television, radio and magazines during the last two 
weeks of the campaign, portrayed an organized and well-run party, 
in contrast to the, "cacophonic score of names, symbols and 
numb.is from oth.r partiaa." This was a naw tactic for APRA*
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which had traditionally used huge rallies in Trujillo as their 
form of advertisement. Garcia wanted the party to become more 
modern and reach more people, which it did. One analyst observed 
the followings
Garcia's success was the consistent 
leve] of support he achieved across 
the whole country, which brought him 
victory in traditional non-Aprista 
areas, (like LimarCallao, shanty-towns,
Casco and Puno.)AJO
One of the major factors in APRA success was the complete 
collapse of AP, polling only 5% nationwide. This left no party 
in the center. APRA filled this void and attracted votes from 
both the right and left to walk away with the election. To 
demonstrate the magnitude of the Garcia victory, he received 
3,629,758, or 48% of the electorate in 1985. In 1980, the
victorious Belaunde got 1,870,864 or 28.4% to ensure his
139victory. In addition, APRA won a clear majority in 
congressional races, ensuring easy passage of reforms.
Many would argue, however, that the most difficult 
challenge for APRA and Garcia was not the electoral campaign and 
victory, as that was made possible by the sharp demise of the AP, 
but rather, the upcoming challenge of governing a country with 
the economic, political and social problems of Peru.
In the first days after his victory, before inauguration or 
assuming official control of the government, Garcia solidified 
his position as the unquestioned leader of APRA. Re positioned 
himself at the center of a web of advisory committees, which 
would in turn limit the decsion-making power of his individual 
ministers***°Garcia was also taking firm control of the economy,
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not passing on all the responsability to his chi^^ economic aide, 
Manuel Moreyra. Garcia was busy meeting with church, academic 
and military leaders in hopes of assuaging any doubts or fears 
they may have had about the new administration.
Garcia made statements in June of 1985 about his continued
committment tc a change in consumption patterns of Peruvians, aid
to labor, small development projects in agriculture and in the
poor sectors of the economy, decentralisation and the immediate
reform of the military, and police forces to help fi ht growing
terrorism and drug traffic. At this point, however, Garcia was
still speaking in general terms, not carrying through specific 
141reforms.
In July of 1985, Garcia and his Prime Minister Luis Alva 
Castro gave further details of his policies in Garcia's Inaugural 
Address. In Alva Casrto's address, he included the following 
economic measurest
*12% devaluation, followed by a freese in the 
exchange rate.
-Reduction of effective interest rates for loans 
from 280% or more to 110% with further reductions 
to follow.
-Wage increases, 50% in minimun wage, 22% for 
teachers and 15% for civil servants.
-General price freese.
-Price increase in gas and other government 
products to avoid increasing fiscal debt.
-Pressing dollar accounts.and dollar-denominated 
certificates of deposit.**
While Alva Castro's presentation emphasised the economy, 
Garcia's was more broad in scope. It can be divided into various 
sectorst A "moralisation campaign,” which would see tougher 
prison sentence for government officials invloved in fraud. 
Reorganisation and clean-up of the police forces, federal
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bureaucracy and other state institutions* In agriculture, 
emphasising import-substitution potential and ending unfair 
competition by foreign goods* Garcia favored an end to tax 
incentives for oil companies and a reorientation of the fisheries 
from fishmeal production to frozen tish. Be promised a strong 
effort to fight terrorism in the south through military aid as 
well as economic programs to solve some of the structural 
problems which led to terrorism. Also, a thrust to limit the 
drug trade* Finally, he expanded on the economic measures 
presented by Alva Castro, including harsh measures against 
Inflation, reiteration of his determination to limit debt 
payments and a strong anti-imperialist stance with the foundation 
of Indo-America***^
Although the speech was drastic and offered a clear vision
of hope for all Peruvians, it lacked specifics on implementation
and execution, particularly in the non-ecnomic sections* Garcia
depended on such words as: reassertion, committee, intention
and request.
In addition, Garcia used many references to Haya de la Torre 
and other broad, ideological themes as solutions to the problems 
of Peru:
Re(Bays) took up the reformist message of the 
Argentine youth in 1918, the revolutionary 
echoes of Mexico, the inspiration of the Ameri­
can Onion of Bolivar and the voice of our 
oppressed race.•.People of Peru, I talk to you 
also in the name of the old heroes and the vast 
multitudes and I speak, too, in the name of he who is 
not here but who snowed me the way. We will arrive 
I tell you children, at the promised land, to the 
conquest of our own bread and our freedom...
I want a government for which power ifjgot abuse 
and pride, nor profiteering or booty. *
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Granted, a certain degree of lofty rhetoric was expected in 
the inaugural speech, especially since Garcia had been elected as 
a result of such promises and a revindication of the traditions 
of APRA and the promises of Haya de la Torre. However, the speech 
seemed to emphasize cosmetic and vague solutions to Peru's 
problems. Garcia stressed the nationalism of Peru, pledging to 
pay only 10% of its foreign exchange for loans. Garcia reasserted 
the idea of Latin American unity, which can be seen through this 
statement he addressed to leaders of other Latin nations:
Let's unite, brothers, to be loyal to our 
peoples and in this way we will have brought 
the future to the present and laid the bases 
in our peoples of an authentic, profound and 
lasting social justice.
These words and ideis gave the Peruvians a sense of purpose 
and revolution, a way out of their desperate plight. APRA had 
become a true populist party as it succedded in attracting 
followers from all sectors of society.
Many Peruvians, however, were frightened that Garcia was 
taking the country too far left in the first weeks of his 
administration. Particularly in foreign relations and foreign 
debt, Garcia sounded more revolutionary than many thought he 
would. He certainly made Peru one of the most defiant of Latin 
American debtors, taking a confrontational stance against the 
U.S. concerning debt and politics. On debt, Garcia stated in 
February of 1986 that, "We will pay our debts when Peru wants to 
and when it can.*1*®
With Peru's total foreign debt over (14 billion dollars and 
real wages dropped by 50%, Garcia took a strong stand about debt
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repayments
In 1986 we would have to pay nearly $6 billion 
on our debt while the total value of our exports 
hardly exceeds $3 billion...We say that the Peruvian 
national salary, which is the product of its 
exports, cannot be impounded...1 tell you-we will 
not be cut in pieces or sold as slaves.
On Nicaragua, Garcia, without specifically naming the U.S., said:
...An act of hostility and intervention 
in Nicaragua will be an act of hostility 
and intervention against all of Latin
America....  if foreign forces (U.S.)
invade Nicaragua, Peru will break relations 
with the aggressive power and m|ke every effort 
to defend the brother country.
Also, in December of 1985, the Garcia administration seised 
the assets of two U.S.-based oil companies, sparking fears that a 
wave of expropriations may follow. Garcia suspended their 
contracts and demanded renegotiations within 90 days, charging 
the companies had not properly reinvested profits obtained from 
tax breaks. Garcia explained the move in the following words:
To be nationalist does not mean to 
expel everything of foreign investment 
from Peru... We believe that foreign 
investment can be favorable to the state, 11Q 
as it is in the PRC, the USSR and Vietnam.
Although Garcia promised not to nationalise other foreign- 
owned operations, the sinple mention of nations like the PRC, 
the USSR and Vietnam made many uncomfortable.
The leftward swing, although it upset some Peruvians and 
members of the international community, was not as radical as it 
appeared. As we shall see, Garcia was sixply using his 
incredible popularity (Be had a 90% approval rating as of his 
first three months in office.) to force through many of his
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reform Ideas, particularly the programs he thought most risky.
14. 1985: Further Reforms
In other areas of government, Garcia followed through on his 
campaign promises, particularly in the most crucial area, 
economics. As expected, in late July foreign currency and 
certificates of deposit were frozen for ninety days, the sol 
devalued 12% and prices of basic products frosen at July, 1986 
levels. Interest rates were reduced as specified in Castro's 
plan, and a price freeze was established on all goods, services 
and rents.150
The effectB of these initial measures was mixed. Production 
and sales dropped 10% over the next few weeks as the devaluation 
and price freezes saw millions of soles leave the private sector 
for the Central Bank and treasury, creating a cash and credit 
squeeze. Manuel Moreyra declared that, "The program is highly 
recessive, the most monetarist ever carried out here."151On the 
positive side, inflation and interest rates did drop.
Other immediate steps taken by Garcia included a wage 
increase of 22% for teachers, 15% for state workers and an 
increased minimum wage. Garcia promised to create new jobs 
through tax and financial incentives. Councils were created in 
different regions throughout the country to promote basic health, 
education, agriculture, housing and electricity improvements. 
Special priority was given to twelve regions in the south
1 S3atrick.n by t.rrori.in.
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There were some holes in the Garcia plan as he did not 
mention plans to cut government spending, come closer to balanced 
budget or exactly how to ease out of the economic freeze without 
causing inflation.
Garcia also began to attack areas of non-economic concern.
On August 19, in an attempt to curb corruption, 37 police 
officers , including 13 plainclothes men, were forced to resign. 
Concerning terrorism, Garcia called the Shining Path, a violent, 
left wing terrorist group, "Ayatollah-like fundamentalists", and 
said he would act agianst them through, "law
enforcement."•‘■“'-’Drugs were also a major area of concern, as they 
were the number one export for Peru and provided $500 million 
dollars to traffickers. Garcia pledged to work closer with the 
U.S. and Columbia to reduce drug production. Between those three 
nations, Operation Condor was formed to begin raids on drug 
production factories.15*In September or 19t5, 41 senior police 
officers were fired for suspected involvement in the drug 
trade.155
In October of 19B5, Garcia presented the October Plan, which 
carried earlier reforms further. It outlined a large influx of 
government funds into a wide range of programs, including more 
wage increases, jobs, inducements to buy national products, 
banning of some 216 non-essential imports, tax changes to 
encourage exports and necessary imports (especially aimed at 
agriculture), incentives for fishing and minig indutries and 
large amounts of money for the worsening terrorist-stricken 
•outh.156
The economy continued to recess as it adjusted to the
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tightening of the money supply. Companies were losing large 
amounts of their profits and as a result were beginning to 
illegally raise prices to avoid bankrutcy. A continued problem 
was how to put capital back into the system without causing 
inflation. Businessmen began to complain in late November, 1985, 
that "earning money in Peru can be dangerous",15^as government 
continued to pass legislation taxing company profits in an 
attempt to build up the capital base of the country. Companies 
were being forced to digulse their profits to stay in business. 
The economy was clearly in recession as growth slowed in many 
sectors, particularly construction, down 11% from the year 
before. Growth was at 2.51, not the 3.3% the government had 
hoped for.158
International as well as domestic pressure began to mount 
for Garcia. In late October of 1985, U.S. Federal bank 
regulators downgraded Peru's loans to "substandard", as a 
reprisal against Peru's unorthadox approach to repaying debt. The 
result of this action was no further loans in the near future for 
Peru and a tightening of credit lines for international commerce* 
Garcia maintained a strong stance, complaining that, "We are now 
enduring reprisals for adopting a nationalistic stance*"159 
Washington also denied Peru important equipment it had requested 
to fight drug trafficking*
The struggle against terrorism and drugs was not making the 
progress that government officials had hoped for either* One 
Lima official complained, "Peru# the largest producer of coca, 
has continued to eradicate the crop, hut only with limited
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success because of terrorist attacks against the 
American-financed workers."160in September of 1985, Shining Path 
guerillas killed 14 people and damaged an electric plant.*^Worse 
than that, the terrorists began to move from their traditional 
area of operations in the countryside to Lima, demonstrated by 
the attack against the U.S. Ambassador's residence in response to 
the American bombing of Libya in April of 1986.
15. 3986s Garcia Moderates Stance
In January of 1986, Garcia began to react to the domestic 
and international pressure. He loosened control over the economy 
and tried to spur growth through increased wages and better 
availability of credit. The short-term results of these measures 
was small, however, as there was little increase in growth.
A more striking development was a softer stand by Garcia 
concerning international credit and the IMP. Paced with the 
likelihood of a further reduction in Peru's loan status, Garcia 
was forced to "play ball" with the IMP and other creditors. He 
allowed an IMP negotiating team to travel to Peru and review the 
status of its loans, a move Garcia had promised he would not do. 
He also agreed to a new round of meetings to take place in 
Washington or New York in the upcoming months.1**
16. Conclusions
The continued unsteady growth of the economy and increased 
terrorism at home forced Garcia to alter his domestic policies9 
while growing international pressure led to a alteration of his
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stance on the IMP. The situation in the Spring of 1986, then, is 
uncertain. Garcia was successful in implementing an amazing 
number of reforms, both domestically and in foreign policy, 
covering a wide range of areas, but emphasizing economics. Many 
of these reforms, however, may simply be pebbles against the 
brick wall of problems which face Peru. It is too early to tell.
The APRA party of Peru has had a amazing history.
Throughout its past, a host of adjectives could describe its 
behavior and character: rebellious, violent, elitist, populist, 
conservative, unpopular, concessional, bureaucratic, divided, 
weak, renewed and finally, victorious. These words reflect the 
dynamic and often contradictory nature of the party.
Por the first four decades, APRA was dominated by Haya de la 
Tone, whose term could be characterized initially by 
confrontation and reform, but for the most part was opportunistic 
and pragmatic.
In the sixties the party saw l i t t le  growth and by the late 
seventies and the death of haya, the efftctiveness and 
attractiveness of APhA platform  was m iniflj.
The late seventies and Mrly eidhfies |Up*eSRd the most
dramatic and eventually effective triform process tftfcih
|
p arty . Baginning with the reform ist }deae and aggteasfon  At 
Armando V illan u eva , ABBA began an b^enihg-hj? and daiW bkafiMHbh 
o f party atructurea which allowed ah important in flu x  o f now 
id o a i arm young lead ers in to  party h ierarchy . Tho roottH bf th io  
new lefward sw ing, youth and open nature o f  th e  party WO* 
emergence o f  Alan Gorcia as a compromise can d id ate , apporohUy
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healing the historic division within APRA that had become more 
pronounced after the death of Haya.
Garcia provided the party and Peru with a vision of hope and 
protest, a vital boost, of confidence for a nation suffering from 
overwhelming economic and social problems. The image of Garcia, 
in addition to the political void on the left after the failure 
of AP, gave APRA the necessary ingerdiants for a successful 
electoral campaign. Garcia allowed APRA to escape from many of 
the limitations and reputations of the past, leading it to a new 
beginning.
The victory by Garcia and APRA is important in that a 
reformist, democratically-elected party had risen to power in 
Latin America. The success or failure of his .iciministration has 
widespread repurcussions. If he manages to truly reform Peru 
and lead it out of economic and political turmoi), his government 
will be an example to other nations and affect how Latin nations 
view themselves, as well as and how they ate treated by others. 
However, if unsuccessful, Peru will likely remain a country with 
overwhelming problems, providing little hope for the troubled 
nations of Latin America.
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